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FINDING FAITH IN CHINA 
 Daryl R. Ireland 
Ian Johnson, The Souls of  China (New York: Pantheon Books, 2017). Pp. x + 455. $30.00 hardcover. 
In 1961, C.K. Yang concluded his magisterial work on Religion in Chinese Society with a prediction. 
Communism lacked mythical and ritual vehicles to transmit its doctrine, so Chinese people would 
ultimately be compelled to seek moral direction and spiritual solace elsewhere. “Even if  the 
Communist ideology were to endure as a sociopolitical doctrine,” he speculated, “it would have to 
develop permanent tolerance of  theistic religion so that theism could perform the moral integrative 
function of  stabilizing the new social order.”  Whether he was aware of  Yang’s conclusion or not, 1
the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Ian Johnson seems to have set out in The Souls of  China to prove 
one thing: C.K. Yang was absolutely right. 
 Despite popular images of  China that are overwhelmingly economic and political, Johnson 
insists “that hundreds of  millions of  Chinese are consumed with doubt about their society and 
turning to religion and faith for answers” (16). After the religious nadir of  the Cultural Revolution, 
the country is now first and foremost a nation of  spiritual seekers. That is seldom obvious. Both 
international and government pollsters still get returns in which close to 90% of  respondents say 
they have no religious belief. That is not because of  a conspiracy by the atheist government to keep 
religious figures low; it is a reflection of  China’s different definition of  religion. Only about one 
hundred years ago did China even get a word for religion—and that imported from Japan. Religion, 
zongjiao, is a foreign term, something that describes an activity that is performed once or twice a 
week, in a distinctly sacred space, under the direction of  a trained expert, guided by a holy book. In 
other words, zongjiao looks like a world religion. Chinese practices do not always meet such neat 
definitions. A bowl of  rice offered in the home to ancestors, fruit put outside stores to feed hungry 
ghosts, or a party among carpenters to celebrate the birthday of  the wood-working god, Lu Ban, 
require few, if  any, of  the apparatuses of  zongjiao. So when asked, “Do you believe in a zongjiao?” the 
obvious answer for most Chinese is no. Asked, however, if  the the Buddha had intervened in their 
lives in the last twelve months, 25 percent recently said yes. Almost half  of  China agrees that “life 
and death depends on the will of  heaven,” and more than three-quarters affirm the reality of  baoying, 
or moral retribution (29). Tellingly, the number of  Buddhist and Daoist temples has doubled to 
44,000 in the last twenty years. That may not approach the temple figures in China before 1911, 
when the Xinhai Revolution toppled the ancien régime, but it is not the number that is most 
significant. It is the speed at which China is racing down spiritual pathways. 
 The Souls of  China is organized around one lunar calendar year. It is a fitting metaphor for the 
book. Despite China’s conversion to the solar calendar in the early twentieth century, the lunar 
calendar is reasserting itself. It is not a carbon copy of  those made in the past, but like China’s 
religious resurgence, the old and new blend together “like a fruit tree in a village orchard: its top cut 
 C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1961), 404.1
off  and grafted onto something new—an effort to transplant the past into the future” (34). During 
the course of  the year, Ian Johnson makes multiple trips to several locations. Building on the 
relationships he has cultivated in almost twenty years of  living in China, he familiarizes the reader 
with the Whole Heart Philanthropic Salvation Tea Association in Beijing. Over seven visits, readers 
observe this small group of  family and friends quibble and fight, but also enthusiastically run a 
shrine and offer liquid refreshment to the droves of  pilgrims who now travel to Miaofengshan to 
pay respect to Our Lady of  the Azure Clouds in her recently rebuilt temple. He also tags along with 
a Daoist funeral master, fortune-teller, and geomancer who has recently moved to Yanggao Town in 
Shanxi province. It is a relatively small city, but one that has sucked up half  the population of  the 
county. As Johnson comes and goes, one listens and watches as his friend quietly and with dignity 
adjusts his traditional services to meet the demands of  a fickle urban clientele, who only half-
remember the old ways and are content with foreshortened and gutted rituals. The author also goes 
to Chengdu in western China numerous times, intrigued by the people of  Early Rain Reformed 
Church. Led by a former human rights lawyer, the congregation is not registered with the 
government, but refuses to operate underground. They meet with party officials, hold services in 
public spaces, visibly engage in various ministries throughout the city, and even mobilize to protest 
such things as abortion. Other groups receive less sustained attention, but provide a sampling of  
what is happening across China. Johnson describes a retreat he joined at a Buddhist guru’s hermitage 
some way outside of  Shanghai, how he sat in holy caves in southern China, and the diligence by 
which he pursued inner alchemy alongside other eager pupils in an apartment in Beijing. He goes out 
of  his way to demonstrate that the return of  religion is real. It appears in all quarters of  the country, 
and among all people. Johnson focuses on the religious revival among his peers, China’s urban elites: 
lawyers, architects, real estate developers, airline executives, bank managers, scholars, and well-
connected children of  senior Communist Party leaders. The book suggests if  religion is gaining 
ascendence among these professionals, then it must be growing everywhere. For in China today, 
religion is not an opiate for the masses. As one informant told him: “We thought we were unhappy 
because we were poor. But now a lot of  us aren’t poor anymore, and yet we’re still unhappy. We 
realize there’s something missing and that’s a spiritual life” (17). 
 The search for spiritual satiation follows what, at first blush, appears to be familiar paths. 
The number of  Buddhist and Daoist monks are growing exponentially. Scholars and government 
officials have rescued Confucianism from the garbage bin of  revolution. Local religious festivals are 
major events again, and funeral rites have returned as a necessary threshold to enter the next life. 
Beneath the surface, however, Johnson adroitly detects subtle changes. Confucianism is morphed 
into guoxue, the study of  the nation, and is used both at home and abroad to promote an idyllic 
version of  China’s past. Local festivals are disjointed events, a mix of  religious devotion and cultural 
amnesia. Families employ both Daoist music troupes to play songs to open heaven at a funeral, but 
also rent a karaoke machine to entertain their guests. Religion is a fashionable, and even important, 
addition to life; however, it is no longer the system of  interlocked institutions that almost seamlessly 
held the Middle Kingdom together. Along with the last dynasty, such a comprehensive and cohesive 
religious culture has crumbled. In its place are a variety of  practices and traditions vying for the 
enormous spiritual appetite of  Chinese individuals. “More and more people experience spirituality…
as private events, sometimes unnamed but which hold great meaning” (320). 
 The manifold expressions of  Chinese religiosity invites the government to employ various 
strategies to control it. That began, already, in the early twentieth century, when the government 
tried to define what is a zongjiao, a religion. Officially, China only recognizes five: Buddhism, Daoism, 
Islam, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism. Everything else has had to redefine itself  to survive. 
Local temples have registered as sites of  cultural heritage. Qigong, a meditative practice, first 
reconceptualized itself  as a medical practice; later, as martial arts; then, after being lumped with the 
Falun Gong movement, it finally had to channel its various techniques into something the 
government could condone: “scientific exercise” (118). As one informant told Johnson, the era of  
miracles is over (255). That serves the purposes of  the state perfectly. The Communist Party does 
not want to abolish religion, so much as sanitize it. Like everyone else Johnson meets, the 
government is desperately seeking a moral anchor. What can stabilize the social order? Various 
friends and acquaintances tell Johnson that they hope faith, a belief  in something bigger than 
themselves, can at least help restore common decency: personal politeness, respect for privacy, and a 
modesty that would recoil from flaunting wealth. Yet the real desire is for something that can heal 
deeper wounds. The Cultural Revolution created a moral vacuum. People, for example, were 
forbidden to help others who were attacked or beaten. If  they did, they were guilty too. Citizens 
quickly learned, “It wasn’t just unprofitable to help others; it was dangerous” (139). Self-preservation 
bled into self-interest, and callousness and corruption now besets the nation. The government is 
seeking to fill the hole in the soul of  China. That includes fairly trite and benign efforts, such as 
inundating the masses with nostalgic images of  the past—“a cross between Hummel sculptures and 
Norman Rockwell paintings”—in order to cultivate a longing for the seemingly simpler and saner 
imperial age, when the kingdom was upheld by a politico-religious authority (349). Such ideas are 
reminiscent of  Confucian teachings, a body of  knowledge the state has been actively resurrecting. 
After decades of  being the fall guy for China’s stagnation at the end of  the nineteenth century, 
Confucius is making a comeback. President Xi Jinping even visited the sage’s hometown, bought his 
Analects at the bookstore, and explained the book’s key to audiences: “A state without virtue cannot 
flourish; a person without virtue cannot succeed” (345). Confucianism has not been the only 
beneficiary of  the state’s renewed interest in religion. Communist leaders are now visiting local 
shrines and Buddhist temples. State media is instructed to cover major religious festivals. Even the 
Party itself  is getting a religious makeover. With biting irony, Johnson describes how the Eighteenth 
National People’s Congress was little more than the Party cloaking itself  with the symbols of  
religious authority (278). 
 Yet not all religion fares so well under the new state policies. Groups perceived as foreign to 
China and which have international ties are still viewed suspiciously. Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and 
Roman Catholicism all fall into that group. Unfortunately, they receive no attention in The Souls of  
China. Johnson justifies himself  by telling readers that these movements are comparably small, and 
tangential to the spiritual lives of  most Chinese. However, the fact that more Muslims live in China 
than in any Middle Eastern country except for Egypt and Iraq makes them a very important 
minority, and certainly one that the government is especially anxious to subdue. The heavy military 
build up in the predominantly Muslim Uygur Autonomous Region, the state mandated prohibition 
of  the Uygur language in school, and the banning of  public prayers and gatherings in that far 
northwestern region belies Johnson’s general thesis. Not all religion in China is revitalized. Some 
believers are barely holding on. 
 Protestant Christians are something of  an exception. They are not one of  the home-grown 
religions that receives soft state support. They see themselves as part of  a global community and 
often cultivate international ties. In other words, like Muslims or Tibetan Buddhists, one would 
expect them to be threatened or ghettoized figures in the larger rebirth of  religion. Yet that is not 
the case. Protestant Christians are no longer an isolated or endangered minority. Since 1949, they 
have multiplied, expanding from one- to roughly seventy-million adherents. In the past, Protestants 
flourished in rural areas and were popularly perceived as old, unlettered women. Today, young, 
media-savvy Protestants are emerging from their shadowy house churches, and making themselves a 
visible feature of  the urban landscape. Few epitomize this change better than Wang Yi, the pastor of  
the Early Rain Reformed Church. As a human rights lawyer, Wang Yi defended a number of  house 
church pastors. He believed in their right to meet, but he was troubled by their strongman tactics. 
Operating in secret, house churches lacked transparency. When he became a pastor, Wang Yi vowed 
to act differently. He began by changing the relationship of  his church to the state. Although not 
permitted to meet, Early Rain has also not been banned. Every week a police officer stops by the 
church on the 19th floor of  an apartment complex to pick up the list of  who attended one of  the 
services that week. “We give them this information,” Wang Yi explains, “we have nothing to hide, 
and the congregation is okay with that too. In fact, it’s a precondition for joining our church…. We 
don’t want to be stuck in the old underground-church mentality. It’s not healthy” (59). He has also 
pursued Presbyterian polity to regulate congregational life, adopted a Calvinist theology that can 
replace the totalizing ideology of  Communism, and he has promoted Puritanism as a guide for 
political action. In a recent interview, Wang Yi beamed that Early Rain is “the true heir of  the 
Reformation.”  That does not mean that the church intends to ape the western church. Early Rain 2
has carefully displayed the history of  Christianity in a hallway of  their facility. It contravenes the 
state’s depiction of  Protestant Christianity as a foreign interloper, for as one walks down the 
corridor a person gazes on such Chinese luminaries as Wang Mingdao, the independent preacher 
who spent decades in Communist prison for refusing to join the registered church, and the 
contemporary Chinese revivalist from Indonesia, Stephen Tong. Early Rain’s infatuation with 
Reformed theology has not stripped it of  its Chinese identity. As one member expressed it, the aim 
is not to turn Chengdu into Geneva, but for Geneva to become real in Chengdu.  To that end, the 3
church is actively seeking to transform the city. It has established Christian schools for children, 
opened a Christian liberal arts college, started a seminary, operates a shelter for the homeless, 
provides aid to the families of  political prisoners, and protests various government policies. They are 
actively trying to create a City on a Hill, and believe their Presbyterianism does just that. They hope 
to show that a republican polity provides an alternative to the dictatorial practices of  both the state 
and underground churches, while also preventing the church and society from sliding into 
congregational populism or chaotic democracy. Like other Chinese religious believers, they are trying 
to embody a better way to organize social life. 
 For Ian Johnson, and the Open Society Foundation that funded his research, evidence that 
the religions of  China may be the womb of  civil society is good news. In Protestant churches, 
Johnson concludes, “this push for a modern spirituality was furthest along”; he found in them a 
religiosity “that didn’t shy away from political implication” (54). However, he also noticed similar 
signs wherever religious groups congregated and inevitably fell into talking about justice, fairness, 
and decency, “aspirations…that are higher than any government’s agenda” (400). Whether 
cultivating the virtues of  Confucianism, following the way of  the Dao, imbibing the ideals in the 
sutras, or submitting to the will of  God, Chinese believers now have an enlarged vocabulary to 
critique the status quo.  
 It is an open question whether or not this religious awakening will be the seed of  China’s 
civil society. A number of  scholars challenge the very idea, pointing out that the concept of  a civil 
society, like zongjiao, is a foreign import that distorts the Chinese experience.  More frustrating for 4
the reader is how Johnson’s book stumbles into the same morass that C.K. Yang trapped himself  in 
decades ago. Despite delivering warm and affectionate descriptions of  the people he meets, Johnson
—like Yang before him—reduces their religion to its social function. Faith fills many roles in 
Chinese society: it promises a legacy (13), provides meaning (187), acts as a social integrater (18), 
solves problems (187), challenges the state (396), and above all else—as Yang before him claimed—
it provides the nation a moral compass (17). Yet, to leave the religious lives of  his informants there 
 Yongguang Xue, “Presbyterianism and Social Change in Urban China,” master’s thesis, Boston University, 2018.2
 Ibid.3
 Like religion, civil society has no equivalent term in Chinese. Currently, two different neologisms circulate, shimin shehui 4
(literally, “resident society”) and gongmin shehui (literally, “citizen society”). Neither term adequately captures the European 
experience of  a third sector, distinct from government and business.
is to ignore what they have been saying to him throughout the book. The author, for instance, may 
interpret a spirit-possessed woman in a temple upbraiding a communist official as a socially safe way 
to challenge the political establishment. There is no evidence that is how she understood or 
experienced the encounter (243). In the end, Johnson has disappointed his own Chinese friends. In 
the first visit of  the book, he is challenged by Old Mr Ni: “You have to decide if  you’re writing 
about practices to make money or if  you’re writing about belief ” (11). Sadly, belief  makes little 
appearance in this overly long text. The book delivers a remarkable and multifaceted look at the 
religious fervor that has gripped China, but when all is said and done we know precious little about 
its soul. 
